V. Unilateralism and Protectionism Undermine China-US Economic and Trade Relations

As a key builder and participant of the international economic order and multilateral trading regime after World War II, the US should take the lead in observing multilateral trade rules and properly handle trade friction with other WTO members through the dispute settlement mechanism within the WTO framework. However, in recent years, the US has resorted to unilateralism and economic hegemony, adopted approaches of "small yard, high fence" and decoupling and severing supply chains, and provoked international trade friction around the world. This has not only undermined the interests of China and other WTO members, but also jeopardized the international reputation of the US itself. And above all, the US has shaken the foundations of the global multilateral trading regime, which will ultimately damage the long-term interests of the US.

1. Rescinding China's Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) Status Undermines the Foundation of China-US Economic and Trade Relations

In April 2025, the White House issued the Report on the America First Trade Policy Executive Summary, which carefully reviewed legislative proposals related to China's PNTR status and advised the president accordingly. The PNTR status, or granting the Most Favored Nation (MFN) treatment permanently, is the ballast of China-US economic and trade relations. The US push to revoke China's PNTR status represents a clear instance of unilateralism and trade protectionist practices, which violates WTO rules and undermines China-US relations and the global economic order.

Revocation of China's MFN status violates WTO rules. The relevant WTO rules require its members to unconditionally grant MFN treatment to all other WTO members, a requirement that has binding legal force. In 2018, based on its domestic laws, the US government unilaterally announced the imposition of Section 301 tariffs on certain Chinese products. Subsequently, it adopted a series of strict unilateral restrictive measures against China in areas such as investment and technology exports. Such practices violate the WTO's MFN principle. Among these, the imposition of Section 301 tariffs has been ruled to contravene relevant rules by the WTO dispute settlement panel. Any move to revoke China's MFN status, whether through legislation by the US Congress or based on any existing domestic laws, directly violates US obligations under the WTO, which is a clear manifestation of unilateralism and trade protectionism.

Revocation of China's MFN status undermines China-US economic and trade relations and destabilizes the global economic order. Over the past two decades, PNTR has served as the stabilizer for China-US economic and trade relations, and has played a far-reaching, positive role in promoting economic exchanges not only between the two countries but even in global economic growth. Revoking China's PNTR status will bring China-US economic and trade relations back to the uncertainty and unpredictability that preceded China's accession to the WTO in 2001. Even worse, it may lead to economic decoupling between the two countries. The revocation of MFN status will significantly worsen China-US economic and trade environment. Economic and trade sectors such as trade in services, intellectual property protection, two-way investment, technology export controls, and exchange of personnel will also be affected. Moreover, the action of repealing the MFN treatment of a WTO member will fundamentally undermine the WTO's MFN principle and destabilize the multilateral trading system that has non-discrimination as the cornerstone, thereby causing serious damage to the multilateral trading regime and the global economic order. 

China opposes any unilateralist and protectionist acts that sabotage the multilateral trading system. The multilateral trading system, with the WTO at its core, is the cornerstone of international trade and one of the important outcomes of human progress. MFN treatment is a basic principle within this system. China has always firmly supported and upheld the multilateral trading regime. Both history and reality have shown that the rules-based multilateral trading system meets the common interests of all countries, while unilateralism and protectionism undermine global industrial, supply, and value chains, and threaten the stability and development of the global economy. China has consistently opposed any unilateralist or protectionist action that could sabotage the multilateral trading system. It is hoped that the US will be clearly aware of the possible harm caused by its attempt to revoke China's MFN status, and work constructively with the overwhelming majority of WTO members in safeguarding a fair and reasonable global economic and trade order and environment. 

2. US Generalization of the Concept of National Security Hinders China-US Economic and Trade Cooperation

The US government continues to politicize economic issues on the grounds of national security. It has introduced a variety of policies and measures to hinder economic and trade exchanges with China, with restrictions and sanctions constantly intensifying. The annual Member Survey report on China's business environment released by the US-China Business Council in September 2024 indicates that the United States' export controls, sanctions, and investment reviews targeting China have become one of the key challenges facing American companies in China. 

In terms of trade, the US side claims that the persistent trade deficit poses a serious threat to its economic and national security. It repeatedly augmented restrictions by employing multiple unilateral measures such as export controls, expanded sanctions and denying market access of China's integrated circuits and telecommunications companies, citing national security as the excuse. In January 2025, the USDOC issued a final rule on Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain: Connected Vehicles, which targets China's connected vehicles as well as related software and hardware as "unsafe" and restricts their entry into the US market. That same month, the USDOC announced the launch of a national security risk investigation into the information and communication technology and services of unmanned aerial systems from China and other countries. The US side announced that it would expand the scope of investigation on information and communications technology and services to encompass the advanced technologies controlled by "foreign adversaries".

In terms of investment, the US issued the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act and established supporting administrative mechanisms, which expanded the authority of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the US and restricted Chinese investments in sectors such as critical technologies, key infrastructure, and sensitive data in the US. In January 2025, the final regulations restricting US outbound investments took effect, which comprehensively restrict US funds and companies from investing in China's semiconductor and microelectronics, quantum information technology, and AI sectors. In February, the US issued a Memorandum on America First Investment Policy, proposing to expand the scope of US outbound investment restrictions from these sectors to include biotechnology, hypersonics, aerospace, advanced manufacturing, and directed energy, among others. In addition, it calls for tighter restrictions on Chinese investments in US "strategic industries".

The series of trade and investment restrictions implemented by the US not only increases compliance costs for enterprises and severely hinders normal China-US economic and trade cooperation, but also affects the stability of global industrial and supply chains and seriously undermines the international economic and trade order. 

3. US Abuse of Export Controls Destabilizes Global Supply Chains

In recent years, the US has generalized the concept of national security, exercised excessive long-arm jurisdiction, and continued to politicalize, weaponize, and instrumentalize export controls, imposing sanctions and suppressive measures on various industries and enterprises of other countries. Such practices have severely obstructed normal economic and trade exchanges worldwide and disrupted the stability of global industrial and supply chains.

The US suppresses other countries in the name of national security and human rights. Since 2022, the US has updated its export controls on China's semiconductor and AI sectors in multiple instances under the pretext of national security, expanding restrictions from integrated circuits to manufacturing, outsourcing, and software - almost covering the entire semiconductor industrial chain. By implementing discriminatory export controls on AI models and integrated circuits that provide underlying computing power support, the US is, in essence, creating a tiered structure within the realm of AI, favoring certain entities while depriving the vast number of developing countries, including China, the right to achieve technological advancement. 

In recent years, the US has placed a number of Chinese entities on the Uygur Forced Labor Prevention Act Entity List under the pretext that they are engaged in "forced labor", and has continuously imposed export controls on Chinese entities under the pretext of human rights. In fact, the enterprises subjected to sanction do not have any issue of "forced labor" - some have fully realized automated production, and others have undergone auditing and inspection by third-party institutions, with no evidence of "forced labor" being identified. Unjust US sanctions have had severe consequences for Chinese enterprises affected, such as supply chain disruptions, fund shortages, and loss of partners, substantially infringing on their legitimate rights and interests.

The US abuses export controls in the unjustified sanctioning of Chinese entities. For a long time, the US has implemented strict export control policies against China, and has suppressed Chinese entities using "blacklists" as tools under the pretext of issues related to Russia, Iran, terrorism, and narcotics. Sanctioned Chinese entities face difficulties such as supply chain disruption and technological cooperation blockage.

In recent years, US sanctions against China have grown significantly in both frequency and intensity. Research by a US think tank revealed that US sanction lists lack transparency and fairness. For instance, the addition of entities to the Entity List for export controls is based on confidential information and lacks transparency; the criteria for addition are opaque and lack clear definitions; the threshold for removal is extremely high, making it difficult for entities on the list to move out through judicial proceedings.

The US measures are counterproductive and detrimental, disrupting the stability of global industrial and supply chains. The US abuses long-arm jurisdiction and deliberately erects barriers and breaks chains through the De Minimis Rules and Foreign-Direct Product (FDP) Rules, in violation of economic laws and market rules. Such practices create huge uncertainty in bilateral industrial cooperation, severely undermine the international trade order, and threaten the security and stability of global industrial and supply chains.

For example, the regulations regarding semiconductors issued by the US government on October 17, 2023 adopted the De Minimis Rules for the first time, according to which the export of specific lithography equipment containing any American components to China requires a permit from the US government. The semiconductor export control measures released by the US on December 2, 2024 imposed restrictions on 24 types of semiconductor equipment, and introduced the FDP Rules mandating that semiconductor manufacturing equipment produced in other countries that contain specific American components must also obtain a license from the US before being exported to China. The purpose is to prevent American semiconductor equipment from entering the Chinese market and prohibit similar products from other countries as well. US chip giant Nvidia commented that these new regulations actually threaten global innovation and economic growth and have caused it to lose market share in China and thus its competitiveness. A survey by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York indicates that various US sanctions against China have caused American companies to lose approximately US$130 billion in market value. 

4. Section 301 Tariff Measures Are a Prime Example of Unilateralism

The US Section 301 tariff measures are a classic example of unilateralism and protectionism. They seriously damage global trade order and the security and stability of global industrial and supply chains, fail to solve its problems such as the trade deficit and lack of industrial competitiveness, and increase the prices of imported products in the US to the detriment of US enterprises and consumers. In a recent development, rather than suspending its current Section 301 investigation, the US has been continuing down this misguided path by proposing a new Section 301 investigation into what it alleges are non-market policies and practices in China.

Section 301 tariffs are inconsistent with multilateral trade rules. They seriously violate the most fundamental and core rules of the WTO, including the MFN treatment and bound tariff rates. In April 2018, China brought a case regarding US tariff measures to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. On September 15, 2020, a panel of WTO experts ruled that the US tariffs imposed on certain Chinese products violated the MFN obligation under Article I of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994. This ruling fully supported China's claims. The US filed an appeal on October 26, 2020. However, due to US obstruction, the WTO Appellate Body has been paralyzed, leaving the case in a state of pending appeal. 

Section 301 tariffs are unable to resolve US trade deficit. Since 2018, the US has imposed Section 301 tariffs on Chinese products for seven consecutive years. During this period, the overall US trade deficit has not decreased; instead, it surged from US$950.2 billion in 2018 to more than US$1.21 trillion in 2024.

The US hopes to reduce its trade dependence on China and diversify its import sources through imposing additional tariffs. The fact that China is one of the US's largest sources of imports is not necessarily detrimental to the latter. During the Covid-19 pandemic, China exported huge amounts of personal protective equipment to the US, significantly supporting the country's fight against the pandemic. Many tariff-exempt measures for these pandemic prevention products have continued to this day.

Section 301 tariffs severely impair the competitiveness of American businesses and consumer welfare. They have resulted in a significant rise in the prices of the US taxable goods, with most of the additional costs borne by American importers, wholesalers, retailers, and consumers. In March 2023, the United States International Trade Commission released a report titled Economic Impact of Section 232 and 301 Tariffs on US Industries, which shows that almost all additional costs arising from US tariff measures against China are borne by American importers. 

5. The US Section 232 Investigations Contravene Multilateral Economic and Trade Rules

Since 2017, the US side has frequently initiated Section 232 investigations as a weapon of trade protectionism to exert pressure on others in negotiations. From 2017 to 2021, it conducted eight Section 232 investigations against products including steel and aluminum, automobiles and auto parts, and mobile cranes. Such investigations had never been more frequent, and the range of products targeted had never been wider.

In April 2017, the USDOC announced Section 232 investigations against steel and aluminum imports. In March 2018, the US announced 25 percent tariffs on steel and 10 percent tariffs on aluminum, citing national security reasons. During the investigations, the US Department of Defense wrote to the USDOC, stating that steel and aluminum imports were not having a detrimental effect on the department's procurement of steel and aluminum products that meet national defense needs. 

It is self-evident that the purpose of Section 232 measures against steel and aluminum is to impose pressure on others in negotiations, and not to address US national security problems. In the renegotiation of the North America Free Trade Agreement, the US lifted the tariffs on the steel and aluminum products of Canada and Mexico only after it was given what it wanted. In the renegotiation of US-ROK Free Trade Agreement, the US changed its Section 232 measures against the steel and aluminum products of the ROK from tariffs to tariff quotas only after the ROK made a compromise on trade in automobiles. In negotiations with the EU, the US changed its Section 232 measures against EU steel and aluminum products from tariffs to tariff quotas only after the EU agreed to drop its restrictive measures on US products and join with the US in opposing what it claims is "non-market economy behavior".

The US Section 232 investigations abuse the concept of national security to justify trade restrictions and put pressure on others in negotiations, which damages the legitimate rights and interests of other countries and regions, breaches US international obligations, and undermines the multilateral trading system. Several WTO members including China and the EU have litigated through the WTO dispute settlement mechanism over the restrictive US measures on steel and aluminum imports. In the dispute settlement procedures, the WTO expert panel ruled clearly that these measures violated the core obligations that must be observed by WTO members, including the MFN treatment and tariff binding stipulated respectively in Article 1 and Article 2 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994.

On February 10, 2025, the US announced the resumption of Section 232 measures on imported steel and aluminum, increased tariff rates on aluminum products, and cancelled tariff exclusions for relevant countries. On March 10, 2025, the US initiated Section 232 investigations against imported copper and then timber. According to the Report on the America First Trade Policy Executive Summary, the US side identified additional products and sectors that merit consideration for initiation of new Section 232 investigations, including pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, and certain critical minerals.

6. US Abuse of Trade Remedy Measures Increases Uncertainty in Trade

The Memorandum on America First Trade Policy specifically requests the USDOC to review the application of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy policies and regulations, including those related to transnational subsidies and "zeroing"¹ . Transnational subsidy investigations and "zeroing" clearly violate WTO rules. Applying these to anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations will artificially exaggerate the dumping or subsidy margin of the products exported to the US, disturb the normal global trade order and economic and trade cooperation, and damage the interests of all parties concerned, including the US itself and its own enterprises and consumers.

The investigations on transnational subsidies violate relevant rules. Over a long period of time, the US acknowledged the basic principle that the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (also known as SCM Agreement) of the WTO does not apply to transnational subsidies and minimized the use of transnational subsidy investigations. The US Code of Federal Regulations stipulates that a subsidy shall not be deemed to exist if it is provided by a government of a country other than the country in which the recipient firm is located, or by an international lending or development institution, unless there is an individual statutory exception. In April 2024, the USDOC amended its anti-dumping and countervailing duty regulations, repealed this stipulation, and began to allow investigating transnational subsidies. Since then, the USDOC has initiated investigations against transnational subsidies in multiple anti-subsidy cases.

This regulation amendment and these investigations clearly contravene relevant WTO rules. The SCM Agreement specifies that a subsidy is a financial contribution by a government or any public body "within the territory of a Member" and that a specific subsidy is one that is specific to an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries within the jurisdiction of the granting authority in Article 2. These all show that the granting authority and the recipient shall be within the same jurisdiction. The SCM Agreement clearly specifies that "The recipient firm is a firm in the territory of the subsidizing Member". Therefore, according to the SCM Agreement, anti-subsidy investigations can only be initiated on a subsidy provided by a WTO member to an enterprise in its territory.

The amendment to the regulation and the subsequent investigations also contravene US law. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 stipulates that a subsidy is granted by a government or public body of a country within its territory to an enterprise or industry within the jurisdiction of the granting authority. Therefore, the USDOC's regulation amendment, investigations, and rulings are without legal basis and unauthorized according to US domestic laws.

The abuse of "zeroing" artificially expands dumping margins. Over the years, the practice of "zeroing" has been treated with skepticism and criticized widely for exaggerating dumping margins. By February 7, 2025, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism had received 27 cases concerning the legality of "zeroing", among which two early cases targeted the EU and 25 targeted the US. The US has been ruled in violation of relevant WTO rules in all cases completed to date. On the one hand, the US has refused to refrain from "zeroing". On the other hand, it has been gradually adjusting the practice of "zeroing" under the pressure of constant legal setbacks. But the US still takes advantage of the ambiguity in the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-dumping Agreement) and insists on applying "zeroing" in cases where it considers "targeted dumping" exists.

If, after reviewing its policies and regulations as requested by the Memorandum on America First Trade Policy, the US revives the practice of "zeroing" under non-targeted dumping circumstances, it will contravene WTO rules and blatantly violate the WTO dispute settlement mechanism's rulings in numerous cases over the past two decades. The revival and expansion of "zeroing" will create artificial dumping or increase dumping margins, thus imposing unfair, hefty anti-dumping duties on products exported to the US by other WTO members, and damaging the interests of the members and their enterprises.

7. US Use of Fentanyl as a Pretext to Impose Restrictive Economic and Trade Measures on China Is Not Helping to Solve Problems

In February and March 2025, citing fentanyl-related concerns, the US side increased tariffs across the board on Chinese products exported to the US twice and threatened to cancel the duty-free de minimis treatment. On April 2, the US side announced the end of duty-free de minimis treatment for covered goods from China starting May 2, 2025. These measures are groundless and will not help solve internal problems in the US. Instead, they will damage China-US economic and trade cooperation and destabilize global trade.

The US accusations against China have no factual basis. In terms of counternarcotics, China's policies and their implementation rank among the toughest in the world. China has enumerated fentanyl-related medications in the List of Controlled Narcotic Drugs and exercises strict control in terms of their manufacturing, sale, use, and export. To date, no cases of fentanyl-related medications disappearing in manufacturing or circulation have been detected in China. The National Medical Products Administration implements a permit system for the export of fentanyl-related medications. Based on strict examination and approval, it verifies with and obtains confirmation of legality of the transaction from the competent authorities of the importing country for each exported shipment of narcotic drugs before issuing a permit for export.

In 2023, China exported 9.766 kilograms of fentanyl-related medications, mainly to Asian countries including the ROK, Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines, Latin American countries including Chile, Panama, Colombia, and Paraguay, and European countries including Poland, Germany, and France. China has never exported any type of fentanyl-related medications in any form to North America.

China and the US have conducted extensive, in-depth cooperation in counternarcotics and achieved significant progress. On April 1, 2019, in the spirit of humanity and on the request of the US side, China issued a statement announcing full control of fentanyl-related substances that came into effect from May 1, 2019, even though there is no evidence of widespread abuse of fentanyl-related substances in China. This made China the first country in the world to implement full and permanent control of fentanyl-related substances. The Ministry of Public Security of China subsequently launched special campaigns for the next three years to combat the illegal manufacturing and trafficking of fentanyl-related substances and other new drugs. Since implementing full control of fentanyl-related substances, China has not received any notification from the US that fentanyl-related substances from China have been detected.

The US concerns about duty-free de minimis treatment are not necessary. The US side claims that duty-free de minimis treatment and its corresponding convenient customs clearance arrangements could damage its domestic industries, and cause problems such as fiscal losses and lack of supervision over merchandise quality and safety. This concern has no practical basis. First, duty-free de minimis treatment has limited impact on the domestic market. Consumers' purchase of personal products from abroad is a helpful supplement to individual consumption. In recent years, global imports of retail packages have been increasing rapidly. However, the overall scale is far from dominant, representing a small share of total world trade and total retail sales. Second, applying duty-free de minimis treatment can reduce administrative costs - customs can pool more resources in the supervision of high-value products and high-risk goods, reinforcing the overall effectiveness of supervision. Eliminating duty-free de minimis treatment will add significant costs in checking and taxing low-value packages one by one, in supervision, in logistics and in customs clearance. Third, the quality and safety of products in low-value packages is guaranteed. Most Chinese cross-border e-commerce platforms allow no-fault return of goods within a minimum of 30 days of purchase. Within the time limit, consumers can return an item for a refund without giving reasons, or even get a refund without having to return the product. These provisions not only protect consumers' rights and interests, but also incentivize cross-border e-commerce merchants to ensure product quality. Fourth, high-risk products are effectively managed and controlled. Chinese products exported in low-value packages are mainly items such as clothing, electronic products, and toys. As supervision strengthens and technological means continue to advance in all countries, no evidence has emerged of any prohibited item found in low-value packages from China. 

The duty-free de minimis policy follows the trend of world trade development. The World Customs Organization suggests that the customs authorities of every country set a minimum tariff threshold. The WTO Agreement on Trade Facilitation encourages members to provide for a de minimis shipment value or dutiable amount on which customs duties and taxes will not be collected. The majority of countries in the world operate a duty-free de minimis policy and simplify customs clearance procedures. 

The Chinese government collects tariffs, VAT, and consumption tax on personal postal items entering China. However, personal postal articles will be exempt if tax liabilities do not exceed RMB50. This policy has worked well.

- It promotes diversity in the consumer market. Consumers are able to buy an abundance of products from all over the world at lower prices. It meets consumers' personalized needs, achieves fast delivery and saves cost, thus improving the buying experience. Taking China's Tmall global import e-commerce platform as an example, by 2024 this platform had offered over 4,000 brands and more than a million products, covering sectors including food, maternal and child supplies, household goods, fashion, and clothing and accessories, and it is still growing. 

- It helps more micro, small and medium-sized enterprises engage in world trade. As a representative of new quality productive forces, cross-border e-commerce cuts trade procedures and lowers entry barriers. Cross-border e-commerce retail links micro, small and medium-sized enterprises directly to consumers, which provides more trade opportunities, expands trade volume, and streamlines trade structure. Currently, there are over 120,000 cross-border e-commerce trade entities in China, which are becoming a significant force in world trade. 

- It facilitates global economic cooperation. The rapid growth of cross-border e-commerce has become a new driver for world trade. The policy reduces trading costs through digital platforms and highly efficient logistics, and helps global supply chains allocate resources more flexibly, thus further promoting interconnectivity of the world economy. China's cross-border e-commerce platform Alibaba.com provides services for 26 million active corporate buyers from over 200 countries and regions. Connected with suppliers worldwide through such platforms, enterprises are able to achieve flexible procurement strategies, multiple market demand analysis, on-demand manufacturing, and higher resource utilization efficiency. 

8. The "Reciprocal Tariffs" Imposed by the US Will Damage Its Own and Others' Interests

On April 2, 2025, the US government announced the imposition of "reciprocal tariffs" on goods imported from multiple trading partners, including a tariff of 34 percent on Chinese goods. It is now imposing an additional 50 percent tariff in response to China's legitimate countermeasures. Disregarding the balancing of interests achieved over years of multilateral trade negotiations, and ignoring the fact that it has derived enormous and long-standing benefit from international trade, the US has chosen to erect high trade barriers in the name of goals such as "industrial protection" and "national security". This is a severe violation of WTO rules that damages the multilateral trading system and erodes the legitimate rights and interests of the parties affected. The move will not help to solve domestic economic problems in the US, but will ultimately backfire and make the US a victim of its own misdeeds.

The tariffs will increase inflationary pressure in the US. The Budget Lab at Yale University forecasts that when other countries retaliate with countermeasures, the US Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) Price Index will rise by 2.1 percent, costing US families with low, medium, and high incomes, as the ultimate "payer" of the tariffs, an average of US$1,300, US$2,100, US$5,400 per household respectively. With the imposition of the new round of tariffs, pressure on the retail price of daily consumer goods such as food, clothing, electronics, and daily necessities will increase significantly.

The tariffs will weaken the US industrial base. The Trump administration intends that these tariffs will force the reshoring of the US manufacturing industry. In reality the tariffs will gradually affect the industrial chain and supply chain, aggravate the risk of supply chain disruption and industrial hollowing out, and add to problems hindering the development of manufacturing. The Peterson Institute for International Economics assesses that over 90 percent of the tariff costs will be borne by US importers, by downstream businesses, and ultimately, through higher prices, by the end consumers. 

The tariffs will aggravate panic in the financial market. On the day following the announcement of the tariffs, the three major US stock indexes each declined by more than 5 percent. Meanwhile, the US dollar has fallen hard against the euro, demonstrating the growing concern of the market at the disruption of the economy, and the drastic impact on confidence.

The tariffs will increase the risk of US economic recession. JPMorgan, Goldman Sachs, and other US financial institutions have all substantially increased their odds of the risk of a US recession. According to their research, the US tariffs and the countermeasures of other countries could lead to a reduction of US real GDP by approximately 1 percentage point. 

At the same time, the tariffs will distort the allocation of global market resources, undermine the foundations of global cooperation, and affect the long-term steady growth of the global economy. They will undermine the stability of global industrial and supply chains, and deliver a severe blow to international economic circulations. The Director-General of the WTO Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala said that the new US tariffs will have a devastating impact on global trade and economic growth, leading to a contraction of around 1 percent in global goods trade volumes in 2025, representing a 4 percentage point drop against the previous forecast. 

History has repeatedly taught the lesson that trade protectionism will not help to strengthen a country's domestic economy. Instead, it will do severe damage to world trade and investment, which could trigger a global economic and financial crisis, with the inevitable consequences for oneself and others. 

[1] In the process of calculating dumping (normal value minus export price), only positive differences are taken, and all negative differences are regarded as zero and cannot offset the positive differences. Compared with normal calculation methods, "zeroing" tends to substantially increase apparent evidence of dumping, resulting in higher dumping margins and anti-dumping duty rates.